This article attempts to forge new links between social attitudes and social policy change in Australia. Drawing on four survey waves of international social survey data and using 
Introduction
Much recent writing about social reform in the Australian context overlooks the importance of social attitudes that may help to explain change. However, linking people's values and attitudes with social reform is a complex but altogether necessary endeavour if we are to understand more about how the modern state is being transformed. Much of the early work on welfare state development points to class politics, and working-class solidarities in particular, as crucial factors influencing social policies (Castles, 1985; Esping-Andersen, 1990) . At the start of the twenty-first century, however, we now understand that individualizing and liberalizing market processes everywhere may be eroding important aspects of social solidarity; once distinctive welfare states may be losing their particularity under the weight of recent market reforms. This article therefore aims to forge new linkages between public opinion and social change in the Australian context. The analysis is supported by data on comparative welfare attitudes from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) (Haller et al., 2012) . Using multivariate regression techniques, we consider Australian preferences for risk protection. We are particularly interested in comparing Australian welfare state attitudes with views found elsewhere, but we are also interested in social attitudes defined by socio-demographic characteristics including 'class' effects in the data (here 'social class' is defined by the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) class scheme, see Leiulfsrud et al., 2010) . In the analysis, we rely on all four waves of the ISSP Role of Government (RoG) module for our sample of leading Western economies that includes Australia. The time span is a twenty-year period and the total country-wave sample comprises over 43,000 records. Before describing the study methods and results and discussing their implications, we consider the scholarship that discusses the links between welfare state attitudes and social policy development.
Theoretical perspectives
Esping-Andersen argues that, according to the logic of industrialism, the 'welfare state' was a functional response to working-class mobilization (in political parties and unions) and the needs of industrial capitalist society (Esping-Andersen, 1990) . Welfare states secured citizens against risk. Their objective was to protect (by guaranteeing a substitute income) male breadwinner wages from the social risks of the day: unemployment, sickness and old age. Although social welfare systems (comprising health, pensions and social security provisions) differed across the industrial nations -suggesting national traditions and cultural factors at play -nevertheless, the emphasis of social policy was placed on full employment (following Keynesian principles) and the protection of working-class families within the capitalist state. In the liberal market economies of Australia and New Zealand, for example, social protection was largely delivered through a family wage policy (Castles, 1985) . In the United States, targeted social welfare programs expanded under the New Deal, while in Britain, the 'Beveridgean' tax-financed welfare state offered a needs-based and means-tested safety net. Australia, New Zealand, the USA, and the UK are said to conform more to the 'liberal' model of welfare capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990) , in the sense that this model represents strong elements of individualism, opposition to state intervention, marketization and the commodification of labour. In Continental Europe, 'societal corporatism' emerged out of industrialization, with 'Bismarkian' systems of worker insurance and company-based social protection schemes in France and Germany. In Scandinavia, Social Democratic governments in the pursuit of equality developed the universal model of 'welfare capitalism' -a broad sense of 'solidarity' (with middle-class support) -came much more easily in the Nordic nations than did either individualism or corporatism, as Esping-Andersen (1990) observes.
As Svallfors (2006) suggests, welfare states may foster and promote social solidarity and they may also reflect it (or the lack of it). Thus, if welfare states have a tendency to produce and reproduce their own legitimacy, from a comparative policy perspective, we might therefore expect welfare attitudes to diverge across the advanced societies, to reflect -at least in part -dominant welfare state ideology. As our point of departure, we might assume that there is regime-related variation in welfare attitudes in the international social survey data.
As previous research suggests, people in the Nordic world tend to be most favourable to government action, while people in liberal market economies are significantly less favourable towards governmental action than people in the Bismarkian nations of Europe (e.g. Svallfors, 1997; Jaeger, 2011) . However, it does not automatically follow that all Australian citizens stand against state actions or particular governmental programmes. Further, scholars now argue that once distinctive welfare regime types are losing their distinctiveness under the weight of reform. Today's diverse, multi-faceted welfare systems often challenge straightforward typologies and policymakers in the Bismarkian and Nordic countries are now turning to characteristically market liberal activation measures to increase labour market entry (Lodemel and Moreira, 2014) . Institutional differences remain (there are different 'activation' and 'workfare' regimes, as shown in Table 1 ). However, attitudinal cleavages, once clearly visible between the worlds of welfare, may soften and diminish with the arrival of activation policies everywhere. In Australia, for example, 'jobseekers' are now obliged to undertake work commitments in exchange for access to social benefits under Tony Abbott's new 'workfare' regime. Welfare state attitudes often vary within countries, depending on the sphere of welfare provision in question. Some social groups in society are perceived as more deserving than others (Papadakis, 1990; Jaeger, 2007) . For example, older people are traditionally perceived to be more deserving than unemployed people are. There are also socioeconomic correlates between different types of welfare attitudes. Previous research suggests that working-class representatives are more likely to support governmental interventions compared to middleclass representatives, particularly with regard to statutory interventions in case of sickness and old age (e.g. Svallfors, 2006; Jaeger, 2007 On the other hand, once firm politically oriented allegiances have become less secure in modern societies, class cleavages may diminish. The working class is said to be in decline with the loss of industry and notions of 'class struggle' (as opposition between capital and labour) now appear to be less apparent in political life (Beck and Grande, 2010) . A new space has opened up for individuals in search of 'individualized' lifestyles. This is part of the process of 'individualization', with civic institutions now tailored to individual concerns.
New solidarities may emerge or become significant in response to 'risk society', to do with age, gender, education or religion (Beck and Grande, 2010 
Methods
The comparative welfare analysis reported here relies heavily on survey data from all four rounds of the ISSP RoG: wave I-IV conducted in 1985 , 1996 and 2006 (ISSP Research Group, 2008 . The ISSP is an important international social survey collaboration providing cross-national and cross-cultural perspectives on key research topics in the social sciences (Haller et al., 2012) . It follows a repeated cross-sectional survey design and employs sampling procedures in an attempt to ensure that views are nationally representative of all individuals aged over fifteen years who reside within private households in the participating countries. In the analysis, we are interested in situating Australian welfare state attitudes in a comparative context, across time and national policy contexts, and we are interested in social attitudes defined by socio-demographic characteristics including class. The time span is a twenty-year period and the total country-wave sample comprises over 43,000 respondents (see Table 2 ).  provide healthcare for the sick;
 provide a decent standard of living for old people;
 provide a decent standard of living for unemployed people; and  provide a job for everyone.
The respondents' opinions on these four questions is the object of our analysis. The response categories were 'definitely should be', 'probably should be', 'probably should not be', 'definitely should not be' and 'can't choose'. The dependent variables were constructed from the four questions, responses being binary coded into positive (definitely should, probably should) and negative (definitely should not, probably should not) attitudes towards the welfare state. The 'can't choose' category was treated as missing data. The explanatory variables are 'dummy coded', e.g., female dummy variable, unemployed dummy variable etc., shown in Table 3 . In the analysis, the Nordic countries are represented by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. We include the 'corporatist' countries of France and Germany, and the liberal market economies of Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. (1996) and IV (2006) . Discontinuity with occupation coding means it is not possible to include the first two survey waves.
V50
Government responsibility: Provide jobs for everyone.
Answers of probably and definitely are coded 'yes'; probably not and definitely not are coded 'no'. V52 Government responsibility: Healthcare Answers of probably and definitely are coded 'yes'; probably not and definitely not are coded 'no'. V53 Government responsibility: Provide decent living standard for the old.
Answers of probably and definitely are coded 'yes'; probably not and definitely not are coded 'no'. V55 Government responsibility: Provide decent living standard for unemployed.
Answers of probably and definitely are coded 'yes'; probably not and definitely not are coded 'no'. WEIGHT Weighting factor All study calculations are weighted. While 'social class' is a key variable in the analysis, it remains a deeply contested concept in the social sciences, as Haddon (2014) observes. Here we adopt the standard EGP class scheme that is widely used in international and comparative research, which relies on occupational status (Leiulfsrud et al., 2010) . EGP classes were created using the SPSSprogram developed by Ganzeboom et al. (1992) , based on the ISCO-88 occupational codes available in the latest survey rounds. The class analysis focuses on survey data from waves three and four; fundamental changes to the way occupation is coded means the earlier rounds cannot be included. 1 According to the theory in question, classes are aggregations of positions within the labour market. Across the whole sample, we observe the following structure: one-third of the working population belong to the professional and higher managerial occupations classes and one-third belong to the 'salariat' (the salaried whitecollar employees). Thirteen percent of the working classes are in skilled manual occupations and seventeen percent are low-skilled workers. The reduction of class to occupation threatens to leave out of the model those citizens who are 'unemployed' (i.e., the benefitdependent group), and those citizens who 'economically inactive' (i.e., people not in work or seeking employment: pensioners and the retired population, students or unpaid family workers and carers). In the analysis, however, other socio-demographic variables are included to produce a multifactoral approach to class and social relations (including labour force status; see Table 3 ).
We begin with a descriptive overview and analysis of the data before using multivariate logistic regression models for binary outcomes (cf. Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000) to assess the socio-demographic characteristics that help to explain or predict attitudes to welfare state functions in Australia and the other leading economies. In other words, we are interested in attitudinal differences at the aggregate level, in terms of cross-national and welfare regimerelated variations and effects, as well as the interaction of aggregate level and individual level characteristics captured by the social survey. The odds ratios in the results (Tables 4 and 5) show the strength and the direction of the independent predictors ('independent' here means after taking account of all of the other demographic and socioeconomic variables in the model Tables 4 and 5 , with cross-referencing to the effects for country and class in Table 6 . All study calculations are weighted to correct for differential and non-response bias in the survey data.
Results
In the survey data, we find that there is almost universal support across nations for governmental actions to ensure decent living standards in old age ( Figure 1 ) and healthcare for the sick (Figure 2 ). In Australia, and even the USA where public support for social welfare is at its lowest, we still find the overwhelming majority of people claiming that these (Castles, 1985) . Workfare policies and other regulatory labour market programmes that undermine collective solidarity also have a long history in the USA, where public support for the principles of collective security is found to be at its lowest in the study sample. In Australia, the key shift to activation came much later in the 1990s, when successive administrations pursued strict work-conditionality policies in an effort to cut unemployment and spending on social programmes (Harris, 2001 ). Universalistic solidarity for the working population emerges most strongly in the coordinated market economies of Northern and Continental Europe. In Nordic countries, for example, less than one-fifth of the public responding to the latest survey objected to governmental action to protect the living standards of unemployed workers: only 10 percent did so in Norway (Figure 3 ). In the Bismarkian nations, we find less solidarity for workers, compared In the liberal group of nations as a whole, we find that negative public attitudes towards state- In summary, we find remarkable agreement cross-nationally on the functions of state welfare to ensure decent living standards in old age and healthcare for the sick. Even in the liberal market economies, there is close to universal support for such statutory interventions.
At the same time, we find that public support for the range of governmental actions to protect workers from unemployment risks is now divided in Australia and the other liberal welfare states, thus revealing substantial cross-national variation. In the next section, we focus the analysis in an attempt to explain this variation in attitudes. In particular, we seek to model heterogeneity explicitly to shed new light on welfare state attitudes defined by sociodemographic characteristics, including, of course, class-attitudes linkages.
Multivariate results
In the next step, regression models are used to explain or predict public attitudes towards labour market policy and attitudes towards social protection for workers. Many people in Australia oppose governmental actions to support workers (Figures 3 and 4) . Nevertheless, some sections of Australian society may be more critical of state intervention than others.
Here we want to identify more clearly those Australians who either are in favour of or are against collective forms of social policy to protect the living standards of unemployed women and men and those Australians that agree or disagree with state intervention in the labour market to ensure working-age citizens have jobs.
Beginning with the results in Table 4 relating to the question about governmental action to provide unemployed people with decent living standards, we find a class effect in the Australian data (model 1). In Australia, low-skilled manual workers are significantly more inclined to support collective social policy to guard against unemployment risks than middleclass professionals. The observed class effects are more pronounced in the cross-national sample, however. In that sample, skilled workers are also more likely to favour collective solutions to help mitigate risk (model 2). Partisanship helps to account for Australian welfare state attitudes. Australians with political allegiances on the left, for instance, are significantly more likely to be in favour of supporting state intervention to secure decent living standards for unemployed workers than citizens who vote for parties on the right (model 1, Table 4 ).
Other things being equal, Labor voters in Australia have three times the odds of reporting that the state has a duty to ensure decent living standards for unemployed workers compared to those voters on the right. greater than the odds for a citizen in paid employment. Governmental action to combat the adverse effects of unemployment is clearly of value to those citizens who are protected by the social policy. Importantly, the data suggest that support for collective solutions to help mitigate unemployment risks has significantly declined in Australia over the past decade, particularly amongst white-collar workers. In general, Australians are more pro-welfare than citizens in the other market liberal economies of the USA and the UK (note that the difference with New Zealand is non-significant, model 1, Table 4 ). The highest levels of public support for governmental action are to be found in the Nordic nations. At the extremes, for example, the odds of a Norwegian citizen claiming that the state should provide decent living standards for unemployed women and men are about seven times greater compared to an Australian citizen (model 1, Table 4 ). In other words, the odds of a Norwegian favouring governmental intervention are five-hundred-and-eighty-three percent greater than the average Australian, after controlling for all other factors.
Next, we turn to views on government action to ensure all workers have jobs (Table 5 ).
Here we find strong class effects in the Australian data (model 1). In Australia, workingclass representatives are much more inclined to support state action to ensure jobs than middle-class citizens. Other things being equal, the odds of low-skilled manual workers supporting government intervention in favour of the unemployed are 52 percent higher than for professionals (observed in model 1, Table 5 ). Furthermore, the odds of an unemployed worker claiming that the state has a duty to ensure jobs for all Australian workers are 28 percent greater than for an Australian who is in paid employment, after controlling for all other factor. Labor voters in Australia are also significantly more likely to be in favour of government intervention to solve the problem of unemployment compared to voters on the right (model 1, Table 5 ). Other things being equal, Labor voters have over twice the odds of saying that the state has a duty to ensure jobs for unemployed Australians compared to voters on the right. The results from the regression analysis can be used to estimate the relative odds of favouring collective social policy for representative citizens in each social class (by country) in order to understand more about class-based welfare attitudes. We saw above that
Australians are more in favour of collective solutions to protect the living standards of unemployed people compared to citizens in the other liberal countries. Now we are able to understand more about the classed effects in the survey data. The results for manual workers in Table 6 are particularly interesting. Low-skilled manual workers are most likely to experience precarious employment and periods of unemployment compared to representatives from the other social classes, so their attitudes towards collective social policy are particularly relevant here. Amongst the liberal countries, low-skilled workers in Australia are most likely to favour governmental action to protect the living standards of unemployed workers. For example, low-skilled female workers aged 25-44 in Australia have over twice the odds of saying the state should act to protect the living standards of unemployed workers, compared to low-skilled female workers in the same age group in both Britain and New Zealand (Table 6 ). We find that the odds of an Australian low-skilled female worker favouring governmental action to protect workers are now three times greater compared to the same worker in the United States, after controlling for everything else. In fact, lowskilled manual workers in Australia are as likely to favour social policy protection as lowskilled manual workers in the corporatist systems of Germany and France, where capitallabour arrangements (including workers' unions) look to secure cooperation among the classes in order to create decent living standards for labourers. Only in the Nordic nations do we find stronger support amongst manual workers for governmental action to protect the living standards of unemployed people, compared to Australia (Table 6 ). There is less crossnational variation in support for collective security amongst middle-class professionals and while-collar workers, except for Norway and perhaps Sweden, where solidarity emerges most strongly in the survey data. For example, a low-skilled Norwegian female worker aged 25
years is now sixteen times more likely to be in favour of social welfare, compared to the equivalent Australian. The equivalent odds for a man are about 15-1. workers, a finding which is consistent with other national attitudinal surveys (Eardley and Matheson, 1999; Wilson and Meagher, 2007) . Our current analysis enriches the discourse by revealing some of the class-based contours in a comparative fashion.
Work has long been regarded as the best way to secure well-being for Australian families. According to the results, solidarity with the working class is weakening in Australia and the other market liberal economies. However, low-skilled workers who experience greater job insecurity have a strong desire to see the welfare safety net more securely woven to protect their living standards in the event of unemployment. Socio-economic position therefore matters when it comes to welfare state attitudes. Manual workers are also more likely than middle-class professionals to favour governmental action to ensure everyone has a job. Significantly, however, support for these particular welfare state functions has declined in Australia over the past decade, particularly amongst white-collar workers. Australians who are more affluent appear to be adopting a tougher line on welfare and are less willing to accept or share collective responsibility for unemployment risks than they once were. It appears that white-collar voters are adapting to the activation measures that were put in place in the 1990s. In Australian social policy terms, Labor's 1994 White Paper, Working Nation, represented a radical ideological departure from the traditional role of social security, which had hitherto focused on redistributing provisions to support those without work. Whether this downward trend will continue remains to be seen. Will we see further declines in support for collective social policy that guards against unemployment risks, as more affluent citizen's look to minimise their own personal risk exposures at the expense of others? Will class antagonisms appear more or less pronounced when the RoG survey is repeated?
Cautions and further research
This study examined Australian welfare state attitudes in a comparative perspective, with particular attention to the class-attitudes nexus. We utilized a cross-national collaboration of ISSP data spanning four survey waves and a multivariate regression analysis. A number of cautions and suggestions for further research follow. representatives set about designing their own social policies to cover unemployment risks and the interaction between the public and private spheres of decision-making, covering insurances, private pensions and other risk-based income maintenance plans.
Secondly, the RoG module focuses on the 'direct' job-creation aspect of labour market policy, providing reliable attitudinal trend data on state job-creation strategies from the four survey waves. However, while spending on direct job-creation still accounts for the largest component of ALMP spending in the OECD, it is in decline, and spending on 'employment incentives' for employers is increasing (OECD, 2013) . Shifting political priorities are particularly important with the more radical US-style workfare programmes gaining momentum in the Anglo-World. In future rounds, therefore, the RoG might look to probe public attitudes to ALMPs more closely, including views on the use of employer incentives and public investment in training programmes.
Finally, national panel surveys might be analysed to shed more light on the views of those individuals who have changed or modified their own views about the role of government over time. Repeated cross-sectional survey data from the RoG allows attitudes to be estimated only at the aggregate level. That is, the attitude of each individual is only measured at one point in time, meaning that any individual change in attitude cannot be captured.
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